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We examine the impact of human resource changes in a large urban district that accelerated 
the hiring timeline for promising teacher candidates. After an initial screening, outstanding 
candidates were granted early offers and placed into the district’s internal labor market to 
interview for open positions alongside incumbent teachers. We find that early-offer 
candidates were more likely to apply, interview and be hired into positions that were less 
desirable to incumbents. After their first year or two in the classroom, early-offer teachers 
had higher average scores than their peers who accepted standard offers on student surveys. 
Value-added and formal observation metrics differences were not statistically significant. 
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Over a decade ago, reports by the New Teacher Project (TNTP), a non-profit organization, 
challenged longstanding school district human resource practices by suggesting that hiring 
practices, particularly those of large urban districts serving primarily low-income and minority 
student populations, impede school systems’ ability to hire high-quality teacher applicants. 
Between 2003 and 2013, large urban districts from Memphis to Houston, New Orleans and 
Washington, D.C. developed programs to accelerate hiring timelines (Van Cleef, 2013). Starting 
in 2014, Minneapolis Public Schools (MPS) joined this group and began to screen and make offers 
to new teachers in two well-defined stages. In the first stage, the district extended early offers to 
outstanding teacher candidates in April and May. These early-offer candidates were placed in the 
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district’s internal labor market to interview for open positions alongside incumbent candidates. In 
the second stage, the district extended typical new hires offers attached to specific, remaining 
positions.    
Though Minneapolis and others have responded to critiques of delayed hiring timelines, 
scholars know little about whether and how changes in personnel policy influence candidate pools, 
teacher quality, and student outcomes. Does the accelerated timeline help districts fill open 
positions with high-quality candidates? Are early-offer teachers better than those hired later in the 
cycle? To help address these questions, we combine two detailed administrative datasets from 
MPS to compare early-offer candidates to new teachers hired on traditional hiring timelines and 
to incumbents.  
We test two hypotheses: (1) that the accelerated timeline improved the candidate pool for 
hard-to-staff schools and (2) that early-offer teachers outperform typical new hires. For the first 
hypothesis, we find that the program did provide a better pool of candidates available to principals 
at hard-to-staff sites. To measure “hard-to-staff” we characterized positions by the number of 
incumbent applicants -- a direct measure of how desirable a position is. Indirect measures of hard-
to-staff included school-level demographics (share of students non-white, share of students 
proficient in reading and math, share of non-white faculty, average years of experience and the 
pupil-teacher ratio). Early-offer candidates were more likely to apply, interview, and be hired into 
positions that were less desirable to incumbents as well as to positions with school-level 
demographics that indicate less advantaged settings. For the second hypothesis, we see some 
evidence that after their first year or two in the classroom, early-offer teachers outperformed their 
peers who accepted traditional cycle offers on all three of the district’s teacher evaluation metrics: 
student surveys, formal observation metrics and value-added. However, only the student survey 
results reach statistical significance so further research is needed before strong claims can be 
substantiated.  
Below, we review the relevant literature on teacher hiring and discuss the Minneapolis 
context, then present methods and results of a three-pronged - interview/placement/performance - 
analysis. We conclude with a discussion of the results and comment on the policy implications. 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Existing research highlights the importance of intentional recruitment and selection to secure high-
caliber applicants (Bruno & Strunk, 2018; Dee & Goldhaber, 2017; Goldhaber, Grout, & 
Huntington-Klein, 2017). This work demonstrates that  hiring practices can be designed to make 
a district more competitive in the local labor market and improve overall market efficiency. This 
work also suggests that the current allocation of teachers is suboptimal.  The status quo 
disadvantages large urban districts that serve larger shares of at-risk students who would have a 
great marginal benefit from highly effective teaching.  
Researchers at The New Teacher Project (TNTP) drew policymakers’ attention to 
pervasive late-hiring, documenting both the scope of rushed practices and asserting a link between 
the timing of a hire and pre-hire credentials. Specifically, TNTP’s Levin and Quinn (2003) found 
that when districts failed to make job offers until mid-to-late summer, 31-61% of candidates 
withdrew their applications. Withdrawn candidates had higher GPAs and were 40% more likely 
to have a degree in their teaching field than the remaining pool of applicants. To the extent that 
GPA and field of degree are good predictors of teacher quality, this suggests the timing of hiring 
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has a negative impact on a district’s ability to hire excellent teachers.  In a 2007 follow-up study, 
using data from Chicago Public Schools, TNTP found that more-credentialed teacher candidates 
had more options available to them and were more likely to withdraw their applications due to 
drawn out hiring timelines than those with fewer credentials, leaving a weaker pool of candidates 
to fill the district’s classrooms. 
Others have presented more nuanced results. In 2009 and 2012, Engel further explored the 
link between hiring delays and credentials, armed with data from the nationally representative 
1999-2000 Schools and Staffing Survey (Engel, 2009; Engel, 2012). Her work confirmed that 
urban and socioeconomically disadvantaged districts hire the majority of their teachers late. In 
urban districts, one fifth of hires are made after the first day of school! Contrary to the TNTP 
reports, however, Engel (2012) found no difference in early and late hires’ credentials including 
certification, Master’s degree, and the selectivity of undergraduate institution.   
Bypassing the need to infer quality from credentials, Papay & Kraft (2016) directly 
explored the relationship between late hiring and teacher effectiveness, measured via individual 
teachers’ student test scores and found that hiring after the school year has started leads to lower 
student achievement. They also found that in math, but not reading, gaps in teacher effectiveness 
persist beyond the first year.  This suggests that, in particular, hiring delays may cause a district to 
miss out on promising math teachers. 
Most of the existing literature focuses on extremely late hiring.  The TNTP studies and 
Engel (2009 & 2012) consider job offers made late in the summer and Papay & Kraft (2016) and 
Engel (2012) look at hires made after the school year has already begun. Hiring when classes are 
about to begin or have already begun is clearly far from ideal -- either teachers have to scramble 
to prepare or students have to start the year with long-term substitutes. In the current study, we 
examine a program that extended offers to outstanding candidates in April and May. Thus, rather 
than comparing a standard hiring timeline to an emergency hire, we study a more policy relevant 
comparison between an accelerated hiring timeline and a standard hiring timeline. 
 
 
Context 
 
We study Minneapolis Public Schools (MPS), an urban district in Minnesota that generally hires 
in excess of 300 new teachers per year. In 2014, when the MPS early offers program began,  MPS 
included nearly 80 schools, employed approximately 3,750 teachers, and served more than 35,000 
students. Of these students, 67% were students of color, 65% were eligible for free/reduced price 
meals, and 10% were homeless or highly mobile. The demographics in the district changed very 
little over the course of the time period studied.  
In 2014, the district hired a new senior director of talent acquisition who was convinced 
that delays in the hiring timeline negatively impacted district recruiting efforts and had detrimental 
consequences for student achievement, especially in hard to staff schools and subject areas like 
special education and ESL/bilingual education. To combat this, the director implemented two 
important district-wide changes to facilitate early hiring.  First, the district began conducting 
centralized and structured interviews. In addition, the district began offering early employment 
contracts to the most-promising candidates who were then allowed to participate in the internal 
labor market.  The changes allow Human Resources staff to screen, evaluate and offer employment 
(but not a specific position) to external candidates, which contrasts with decentralized hiring in 
which a principal evaluates and offers a specific position. 
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The district’s internal labor market is referred to as “interview and select.”  Interview and 
select was first laid out in a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) attached to the 2007-2009 
teachers collective bargaining agreement. This MOU replaced a system that was entirely dictated 
by seniority with a system that let principals and site-based hiring teams interview up to ten 
candidates -- the five most senior candidates in the applicant pool and any five other candidates of 
their choosing. 
Prior to 2014, internal candidates interviewed for open positions before any external 
candidates were considered. Only after all incumbents were placed were external candidates 
interviewed. External candidates submitted applications to the district’s central human resources 
(HR) office who then sent principals and site-based hiring teams a long list of external candidates 
who met minimal criteria  (i.e. correct licensure and legal standing for employment). From the 
district’s perspective, while teachers’ collective bargaining agreement did not mandate late hiring, 
in practice, waiting for the internal market to clear first often led to a drawn out process. 
Starting in the spring of 2014, the district’s central HR office implemented more rigorous 
screening of external candidates and began making use of the “contract unassigned” part of the 
MOU. Resume markers such as GPA, licensure, and experience were used to select promising 
external candidates for preliminary screening interviews. HR staff conducted these short 
interviews with high mark candidates both in-person at large job fairs and via telephone, ranking 
them in response. Candidates who rated highly, signed early offer contracts with the district during 
"Early Contract Meet and Greet" events at the end of April and May.  
These early offer contracts were not guarantees of employment nor were they linked to a 
specific position.  Rather, these early offer contracts gave the candidates official employee status 
so that they could be placed into the district’s internal labor market and could interview for open 
positions alongside incumbents. In 2014, after the policy change, there was no significant change 
in the overall number of new teachers; however, approximately 25% of new teachers were offered 
early contracts, and thus their placement was accelerated in a way that had not previously been 
possible. 
          Once incumbents and early-offer teachers applied for open positions, principals and site 
based hiring teams interviewed the five most senior candidates and up to five additional candidates 
of their choosing  to fill out their pool. The additional candidates can be incumbents and/or early 
offer teachers.  There is no formal flag in the centralized system that indicates to principals and/or 
hiring teams that a candidate is an incumbent teacher or an early-offer teacher, but presumably, 
hiring committees can deduce the information from candidates’ resumes (early-offer teachers 
generally lack teaching experience and would not list an MPS school as their most recent 
employment). Anecdotal evidence collected from interviews with HR personnel and school 
principals suggests that there was some informal information sharing that happened outside of the 
centralized system where HR personnel alerted principals to early-offer candidates they thought 
would be a good match for their site. HR provided only basic support to the early offer candidates 
as they navigated the internal labor market. The candidates received information about the process 
at the Early Contract Meet and Greet events but were not systematically encouraged to apply to 
any specific sites.   
After the interviews were completed, schools ranked their top four choices and the 
centralized system made an offer to the top ranked candidate. The system automatically moved 
to the second ranked candidate if the top ranked candidate declined and so on. Once this process 
cleared (all positions were filled or all ranked candidates had been offered a position), a second 
round repeated the process from the beginning. The second round filled positions vacated by 
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incumbents who moved in the first round as well as any other positions that became open in the 
meantime. At the end of the second round, any candidate who was still in need of a placement 
and any school that was still in need of a candidate all met in a large space for a “speed-dating” 
type final round to try to make a few final matches. It was possible for an early offer candidate to 
remain unmatched even through this final round. In this case, the district could release an early 
offer candidate with an early contract the same way they could release any probationary teacher. 
The early contract offer was not, therefore, a guarantee of employment, but rather an opportunity 
to compete alongside incumbents. Table 1 provides an overview of the hiring and placement 
timeline for early-offer candidates. 
 
 
TABLE 1 
Early Offer Hiring and Placement Timeline 
Task and Activity Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug 
Resumes submitted X X X X     
Screenings by HR at job fairs and/or  
     phone interviews 
 X X X     
Early offer contracts issued at “Meet and  
     Greet” events 
   X X    
Internal labor market    X X    
Internal labor market final matching round.  
     Unmatched early offer contracts  
     terminated 
     X   
Standard external hiring process until all  
     positions filled 
     X X X 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Data 
 
We relied on two administrative datasets to assess the early hiring process. Variable selection was 
governed largely by what was collected and available in the internal HR systems. The first dataset 
contained information gathered during the interview and select process for spring 2014 and spring 
2015. This dataset was position-applicant level (i.e. a teacher can be an applicant to multiple open 
positions). We observed which positions early-offer candidates and incumbent teachers applied to, 
whether they were granted an interview, and, if so, whether they were ranked and what that ranking 
was. The second dataset combined administrative HR data regarding position and personnel 
characteristics (specifically school, subject, step/lane, seniority, age) with teacher evaluation 
metrics for three school years: 2013-14, 2014-15 and 2015-16. This dataset was teacher-level. The 
analytic sample for the second dataset included all teachers - all incumbents regardless of whether 
they applied for a new position and all new teachers, both early-offers and others hired on the more 
standard timeline - with both human resource data and evaluation scores.  Our analytical sample is 
constrained to only those who have both outcome data and HR data.  Therefore, we acknowledge that the 
comparisons are not necessarily representative of all of the district’s teachers. This is largely due to the fact 
that outcome data disproportionately picks up teachers from certain subjects and grade levels. 
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MPS evaluated teacher effectiveness with four distinct metrics: value-added math scores, 
value-added reading scores, student surveys, and formal classroom observations.  This multi-
faceted approach is in line with best practices outlined by the Measures of Effective Teaching 
Project (Mihaly, McCaffrey, Staiger, & Lockwood, 2013). All of the evaluation scores have been 
normalized to a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1, and should be interpreted as standard 
deviations from the mean of the district’s overall teacher workforce. A teacher who scores a 1 is 
one standard deviation above the mean and thus outperformed 84% of her peers in that year. In 
some models, we pooled value-added math and reading to reduce noise, increase sample size, and 
improve statistical precision. For all the metrics, we calculated lifetime-averages using inverse-
variance weights over the 2013-14 to 2015-16 school years. The lifetime averages included all the 
data available for a given teacher, thus increasing accuracy. The inverse variance is a direct index 
of the precision of the effect size. Inverse-variance weighting is used to combine the results from 
independent measurements. The inverse-variance weighted average has the least variance among 
all weighted averages, which are calculated as: 
 
𝐷2(ŷ) =
1
∑𝑖 1/𝜎𝑖
2
. 
 
In 2014, the district hired 419 new teachers between the start of April and the end of 
September. Of those, 322 were hired on the standard timeline and 97 were early offers (however, 
only 96 early-offer teachers had at least one outcome score). In the second year of the early offers 
program, 338 new teachers were hired, 269 on a standard timeline and 69 early offers. Our main 
analytic sample pooled the two cohorts by lifetime averages giving us a total of 165 unique early 
hires. In both years there is some “melt,” that is, people who are given early offers and then never 
show up in our dataset. This happens for three reasons (1) they are given an early offer but then 
take a position elsewhere and withdraw their application before being placed into a school, (2) 
they continue with the early offer process but are unmatched through the internal labor market and 
are released, (3) they are successful in the internal labor market and are placed into a position but 
were not evaluated. 
 
 
Analysis 
 
We assessed whether and how changes in the MPS hiring process influenced candidate pools, 
teacher placements and student outcomes via three primary comparisons. First, we compared the 
interview patterns for early-offer teachers and incumbent teachers who participated in interview 
and select. Next, we compared early-offer first-year teachers to other first-year teachers hired on 
the standard timeline and to all incumbents in the district along two dimensions: the characteristics 
of the school where they worked and their individual evaluation scores.  
Recall that our first hypothesis was that the early offers program impacted the candidate 
pool for hard-to-staff schools and subject areas. Without the early offers program, the pool of 
candidates available during interview and select would have been only incumbents so the relevant 
comparison is early-offer teachers to incumbent teachers who applied to one or more open position 
during interview and select. We tested for differences in age, race and gender -- the demographic 
markers available in the dataset. Race was coded as white or non-white and gender was coded as 
female or non-female. For these binary variables, the mean shows the share white and the share 
female, which were multiplied by 100 to be converted into percentages. .  
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We report differences in means/percentages between early-offers and incumbents and 
whether the differences were statistically significant using two-tailed, two-sample t-tests with 
pooled variance.  We tested the result of this simple comparison of means to more sophisticated 
methodologies including multivariate regression and kernel density plots but in all cases found 
that the basic t-test was sufficient, and thus favored this methodology given the ease of exposition.  
 
Ho : 𝜇early = 𝜇incumbent 
HA : 𝜇early ≠ 𝜇incumbent 
 
𝜇early is the mean for early-offer teachers who participated in interview and select and 𝜇incumbent  is 
the mean for incumbent teachers who participated in interview and select. 
In addition to teacher-level demographics, we characterized teachers by the number of 
positions they applied to and we characterized positions by the number of incumbent applicants,  
the latter being a direct measure of how desirable a position is and thus how “hard-to-staff” it 
might be. Indirect measures of “hard-to-staff” included school-level demographics (share of 
students non-white, share of students proficient in reading and math, share of non-white faculty, 
average years of experience and the pupil-teacher ratio). These school characteristics described the 
types of positions that early-offer teachers favored relative to the types of positions favored by 
incumbents. 
We were able to infer the quality of the candidates by noting how they fared at each stage 
of the interview and select process. Here, quality was measured by whether the hiring team was 
impressed enough with their materials to grant an interview and impressed enough with their 
interview to rank them for an offer. For each stage we calculated the probability of success. For 
example, the probability of an incumbent teacher being invited to interview was the count of all 
incumbent interviews divided by the total number of incumbent applicants. Additionally, since the 
interview and select process mandated that the most senior teachers be granted interviews, we also 
calculated probability of being invited to interview excluding these automatic interviews. On one 
hand, the fact that it is impossible to know whether these most senior teachers would have been 
invited to interview in the absence of automatic interviews argues for including these teachers in 
the calculation. On the other hand, the fact that these interview slots were not the purview of the 
site hiring committee argues for excluding automatic interviews. We report both. 
Next, we used the district’s main human resource database to assess the differences in 
placement for incumbent and first year teachers by comparing the placements for each group across 
several dimensions including experience, zone, and subject. Here we made two sets of 
comparisons: 
 
Ho : 𝜇early = 𝜇incumbent    Ho : 𝜇early = 𝜇othernew 
HA : 𝜇early ≠ 𝜇incumbent    HA : 𝜇early ≠ 𝜇othernew 
 
As before, 𝜇𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦 was the mean for early-offer teachers and 𝜇incumbent  was the mean for 
incumbents. We also compared 𝜇othernew, the mean for other new teachers who were hired on the 
more standard timeline (these teachers were not allowed to participate in interview and select, so 
they were not in the previous data set). The teacher demographics we observed were age, advanced 
degree (i.e. Master’s or higher) and years of experience. We also employed a range of 
characteristics about the job where the teacher was placed including subject and grade level, where 
the school was located, and whether it was considered a “focus” or “priority” school. All of these 
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variables gave us a sense for how the early offers program changed the district’s hiring outcomes 
across different types of job postings. 
Finally, we compared mean value-added and student survey evaluation scores for early-
offer, other first year, and incumbent teachers. Using all three evaluation metrics described above 
(value-added, student surveys, and formal observations), we could address our second research 
hypothesis and investigate whether early-offer teachers were better hires than teachers hired on a 
more standard timeline. 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
We present results in three parts, each corresponding to the analyses described above. First, we 
report on how early-offer teachers fared in the internal labor market. We see the schools to which 
early-offer teachers chose to apply, whether they were granted interviews, and, if so, whether they 
were ranked highly by the principal and/or hiring team at each school. Our second set of results 
illustrates differences in the placements of incumbent and first year teachers. This is important 
because the early offers program was intended to help fill hard to staff vacancies such as special 
education and ESL/bilingual. Finally, we show the ex-post effectiveness measured by lifetime 
averages of value-added, student surveys and formal observations for early-offer teachers 
compared to incumbent teachers and other new teachers. 
 
 
Comparing Teacher Preferences 
 
First, we assessed whether early-offer teachers had different preferences than incumbents. The 
relationship between early-offer and incumbent preferences over school characteristics is 
theoretically ambiguous. On one hand, teacher candidates who commit to a large urban district 
early in the hiring season may be disproportionately interested in working for schools that serve 
large numbers of low-income and non-white students. On the other hand, evidence from previous 
work shows that, holding salary constant, teachers prefer to work at schools that serve higher 
achieving, higher-income and whiter student bodies, and early-offer teachers may be no different. 
Table 2 compares early-offer teachers to the incumbent teachers who participated in the 
internal labor market, pooling data from 2014 and 2015. The early-offers were a sizable component 
of the internal labor market, comprising fully 15% of all teachers who applied for open positions 
in these two years. It is important to remember that the comparison group here was not all 
incumbent teachers but rather incumbents who self-selected into the interview and select system, 
indicating that they were interested in changing positions. Demographically, early-offer teachers 
and incumbents were equally likely to be female and non-white. Early-offer teachers were much 
younger than incumbents. The average early-offer teacher was 13.65 years younger than the 
average incumbent who participated in interview and select. 
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TABLE 2 
Summary Statistics of Early-Offer and Incumbent Teachers in Internal  
Interview & Select System, 2014-2015 Pooled School Years 
  (1) Incumbent (2) Early 
Difference in Means 
(Early-incumbent) 
% Female 75.00 75.00 0.00   
Avg. Age 42.42 28.77 -13.65 *** 
% Non-White 15.00 16.00 1.00   
Avg. Number of Applications 6.88 14.01 7.13 *** 
Number of incumbents in pool 10.71 8.90 -1.81 *** 
 
School Attributes 
     % Non-white Teachers 12.96 14.03 1.08 ** 
     % Non-white Students 67.05 76.19 9.14 *** 
     Avg. Years of Teacher Exp. 13.35 12.46 -0.89 *** 
     % Students Proficient in Reading 52.7 46.67 -6.04 *** 
     % Students Proficient in Math 46.12 37.94 -8.18 *** 
     Pupil-teacher Ratio 16.15 15.17 -0.98 *** 
 
Interview 
     Prob. Interview 0.52 0.41 -0.11 *** 
     Prob. Interview (excluding 
          automatic interviews) 0.15 0.41 0.26 *** 
     Prob. Ranked | Interview 0.38 0.47 0.09 *** 
     Prob. Ranked First | Interview 0.18 0.21 0.04 *** 
     
Maximum Unique Teachers 879 160     
Maximum Unique Applications 5,932 2,454     
Note: *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1. 
 
 
Early-offer teachers applied more widely than incumbent teachers. On average, early-offer 
teachers applied for 14.01 positions while incumbents applied for only 6.88. Figure 1 compares 
the distribution of applications by teacher type. The modal incumbent applied for one or two 
positions while the modal early-offer candidate applied for 10 or more. This reflects the fact that 
incumbents generally have an existing position to fall back on so they only apply for open positions 
they find more desirable than their current job while early-offer teachers are effectively 
unemployed since they have no confirmed position and thus apply for any job they would find 
minimally acceptable. 
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Figure 1. Number of applications by incumbents and early offers, 2014-2015 pooled school years. 
 
 
Table 2 also describes the types of schools that early-offer teachers chose to apply to and 
how this compared to incumbents. For teachers who apply to positions at more than one school, 
we took the average across all their applications. On average, early-offer teachers applied to 
schools that had more non-white staff and students and where teachers had fewer years of 
experience. Rather than use school characteristics to indirectly measure desirability, we used a 
more direct measure of interest in schools: the size of the applicant pool. The number of incumbent 
teachers who applied to a given position is a good indicator of how attractive the position is to 
teachers. In the first panel of Table 2, we see that incumbent teachers apply to positions that 
attracted an average of 1.81 more incumbent applicants indicating that early-offer teachers were 
overrepresented for positions with fewer applicants. 
The third panel of Table 2 describes how early-offer teachers fared with their applications. 
We found that early-offer teachers were significantly less likely to be granted an interview than 
incumbent teachers; 52% of incumbent teachers who applied were granted an interview while only 
41% of early-offer teacher applications were. Much of this was driven by the fact that the four 
most senior teachers who applied to a position were automatically given an interview. When we 
excluded these automatic interviews, the findings reversed and early-offer teachers actually got 
more interviews than incumbents - fully 41% of early-offer teachers were granted interviews 
compared to only about 15% of incumbent teachers. 
Furthermore, when early-offer teachers progressed to the interview stage, they were more 
likely to be ranked as one of the top four candidates.  Post-interview, we found that 38% of 
incumbents were ranked compared with 47% of early-offer teachers. When we focused on teachers 
who were ranked first for a given position, and thus had the first right of refusal, early-offer 
teachers again edged out incumbents 21% to 18%. We further characterized how well they fared 
by how many offers they received. Figure 2 shows the distribution of offers in any given round of 
the internal labor market process. More than half of those granted offers received only one offer 
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in a given round; however, a few teachers received many offers. Early-offer teachers were more 
likely to receive multiple offers than were incumbents. Approximately 13.5% of early-offer 
teachers received three or more offers in a given round; the same figure for incumbents was 4.7%. 
 
 
 
 Figure 2. Number of job offers during any round by incumbents and early offers, 2014-2015 pooled school years. 
 
 
Not all early-offer teachers secured a position through the interview and select process, and 
some remained unmatched as the internal labor market iterated through offers. We found that 7.5% 
of early-offer teachers were not picked up by a school during either of the two interview rounds. 
These teachers then participated in the “speed-dating” style attempt to connect unmatched teachers 
and open positions. The share of early-offer teachers who remained unmatched after that final 
opportunity was not statistically different than the 5.6% of incumbents who were also unmatched. 
 
 
Comparing Teacher Placements 
 
The early offers program was intended to secure outstanding teacher candidates and to facilitate 
placement of these teachers into classrooms where they were needed most. We characterized need 
by demographics (low income, low test scores) and in subject area (special education, English 
second language, science). Table 3 summarizes the positions for all district teachers broken out by 
incumbents and first-year teachers who are further divided into early-offer teachers and other new 
teachers. For consistency with the next table that focuses on evaluation scores, we limited the 
analytic sample to only those teachers with at least one lifetime average outcome score. We found 
that early-offer teachers were a younger, less experienced and less academically credentialed group 
than both incumbents and other new teachers. 
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TABLE 3 
Placements for District Teachers with Evaluation Scores 
2014-2015 Pooled School Years 
  
(1) Incumbent 
First year teachers Difference in Means 
  
(2) 
Early 
(3) 
Other new 
Early – 
other 
Early - 
incumbent 
Age 44.70 28.62 35.06 -6.44 *** -16.08 *** 
Advanced degree 
(lane) 0.74 0.36 0.44 -0.08 * -0.37 *** 
Experience (step) 17.00 3.40 6.69 -3.30 *** -13.61 *** 
 
Zone, Priority, Focus 
     Zone1 0.29 0.40 0.42 -0.03   0.10 *** 
     Zone2 0.29 0.27 0.23 0.03   -0.02   
     Zone3 0.30 0.32 0.27 0.06   0.01   
     Priority School 0.12 0.28 0.21 0.08 ** 0.17 *** 
     Focus School 0.29 0.38 0.27 0.11 ** 0.09 *** 
 
Subject              
     Elementary 0.34 0.36 0.27 0.09 ** 0.02   
     Secondary  
     (Math, English,  
     Science, Soc.) 0.21 0.27 0.20 0.07 * 0.07 ** 
    Math  0.04 0.12 0.05 0.07 *** 0.07 *** 
    Science 0.04  0.05 0.04  0.00   0.01   
ESL/Bilingual 0.07 0.14 0.09 0.05 * 0.07 *** 
Special Ed 0.23 0.13 0.19 -0.06 * -0.10 ** 
K12 Specialists 0.13 0.08 0.19 -0.11 *** -0.05 ** 
 
Placement              
     Elementary 0.59 0.68 0.57 0.11 *** 0.10 ** 
     Middle Schools 0.11 0.09 0.16 -0.06 * -0.02   
     High Schools 0.20 0.22 0.21 0.01   0.01   
        
Unique teachers 2,491 162 642        
Notes. Experience (step) was not available for 2015 new teacher hires.  *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * 
p < .1. 
 
 
The second panel of Table 3 shows the distribution of teachers by zone, priority school 
status and subject. The district was divided into three zones. One way to understand the differences 
in zones is to consider state-identified schools with low student achievement or large achievement 
gaps. Minneapolis had 21 state-defined “Focus” schools and 11 “Priority” schools. The state 
Department of Education releases a list of Priority and Focus schools every three years. Our data 
reflects a Department of Education list a year prior to the start of the Early Offers policy, 2013-14. 
A Priority school is a school identified in the most persistently low-performing 5% of Title I 
schools. The 10% of schools with the largest achievement gaps statewide are declared Focus 
schools. Looking at Focus schools by zones, there were six Focus schools in Zone 1, ten Focus 
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schools in Zone 2, and five Focus schools in Zone 3.  Nine of the district’s “Priority” schools were 
in Zone 1. This zone was home to the most students of color, the most students eligible for 
free/reduced price meals, and the highest number of students who were homeless or highly mobile. 
More first-year teachers were placed in Zone 1 than either of the other two zones. This zone had 
40% and 42% of early-offer and other new teachers, respectively, compared to 29% of incumbent 
teachers. While the difference between early-offer and other new teachers in Zone 1 was not 
statistically significant, the difference in proportions of early-offers and incumbents in this zone 
was significant (p < .01). Likewise, both early-offer teachers and other new teachers were more 
likely than incumbents to be placed in focus or priority schools. Here, however, we saw that early-
offer teachers were even more likely than other new teachers to be in high-need schools. We 
observed that 28% of early-offer teachers were placed in priority schools, compared to 21% of 
other new teachers. This difference was significant (p < .05). Moreover, 38% of early-offer 
teachers and 27% of other new teachers were placed in focus schools compared to 30% of 
incumbents, and these differences were also statistically significant. 
In the bottom two panels of Table 3, we look at the distribution of teachers by subject and 
grade level. Early-offer teachers were more likely than other new teachers to work in elementary 
schools, secondary subject areas (math, English, science, and social studies), and English language 
learner or bilingual classrooms. Looking at math, 12% of early-offers were math teachers 
compared to only 5% of other new teachers, but early-offers and other new teachers were just as 
likely to be science teachers. Early-offer teachers were less likely to be special education teachers 
or K-12 specialists. K-12 specialists include physical education teachers, business, family and 
consumer science, health, world languages, reading, industrial technology, art, media, music, 
technology, and theater/dance. This pattern repeated when we compared early-offer teachers to 
incumbent teachers. 
 
 
Comparing Teacher Outcomes 
 
In this section, we compare the measured outcomes of early-offer teachers to other new teachers 
and to incumbents. Table 4 reports the lifetime average effectiveness of early-offer, other new, and 
incumbent teachers using the district’s three metrics: value-added, student surveys and classroom 
observations. 
We found that, on nearly every metric, incumbents outperformed early-offer teachers and 
other new teachers hired on a standard timeline, and in several cases (pooled value-added, value-
added math and formal observations) differences were large and statistically significant. Early 
offer teachers, however, outscored other new teachers on only student surveys. While the means 
for early offer teachers are consistently higher than other new teachers, there is insufficient 
evidence to reject the null hypothesis of no difference.  
Recall that some early-offer teachers were ranked highly right away, others were not picked 
up even through the final matching process. When we focused on the early-offer candidates who 
were given one or more specific job offers in the first round of the internal labor market interview 
process we found that these teachers outperformed other new teachers on both the student surveys 
and the formal observations (results are available upon request). The fact that the formal 
observation difference was then statistically significant indicates that the characteristics that make 
these candidates stand out in an interview setting are the same characteristics which make them 
stand out when observed in the classroom. 
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TABLE 4 
Summary Effectiveness Outcomes of the District's Evaluated Teachers 
2014-2015 Pooled School Years 
   First Year Teachers Difference in Means 
 Effectiveness 
Measure 
(1) 
Incumbent 
(2) 
Early 
(3) 
Other new 
Early – 
other 
Early - 
incumbent 
VA pooled (N) 1385 102 251       
        Mean 0.00 -0.11 -0.23 0.12   -0.11 * 
VA reading (N) 1185 82 207       
        Mean -0.02 -0.01 -0.18 0.17   0.01   
VA math (N) 934 77 176       
        Mean 0.00 -0.22 -0.38 0.17   -0.22 ** 
Student surveys (N) 2226 141 476       
        Mean 0.00 -0.06 -0.25 0.18 * -0.06   
Formal obs.  (N) 2855 161 631       
        Mean 0.00 -0.57 -0.71 0.14   -0.58 *** 
        
Unique teachers 2855 162 642        
Note:  *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1. 
 
 
Robustness and Limitations 
 
One potential worry is that even if the early offer program successfully identified strong 
candidates, these candidates might very well have been hired in the absence of the early offers 
program.  That is, they may have persisted with the standard hiring timeline, in which case the 
time and energy invested in the screenings could have been better spent on other HR initiatives. 
We were able to test this possibility for a subset of the candidates for whom we had full screening 
interview information. We observed 52 candidates who were not invited to participate in the early 
offers hiring process but ended up being hired by the district later in the summer on the more 
standard timeline. These teachers, as a group, had slightly lower, but statistically indistinguishable, 
effectiveness scores than early-offer teachers. 
A second worry could be that the early offers program was differentially effective and that 
average outcomes were masking important variance. Contrasting means can hide differences in 
the tails of a distribution, and since the goal of extending early offers was to identify teachers who 
are highly effective, one could also deem the early offers program successful if it was able to 
secure teachers at the very top or screen out teachers at the very bottom of the effectiveness 
distribution. As a robustness check, we also compared teachers using kernel density plots. Kernel 
density plots estimate the underlying distribution of effectiveness using nonparametric methods to 
estimate the probability of observing teachers in any given range of effectiveness. We found no 
evidence that early-offer teachers were more (less) likely to be at the top (bottom) end of the 
average lifetime effectiveness distribution. 
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DISCUSSION 
 
In sum, the early offers program was intended to secure outstanding teacher candidates and to 
facilitate placement of these teachers into classrooms where they were needed most. The district 
was able to increase the size of the applicant pool at less desirable sites by adding early-offer 
teachers to the internal labor market. For those granted interviews, the early-offer candidates fared 
better than the incumbent candidates. This was well-aligned with the goal of giving early offers to 
candidates who the central office felt would be desired by multiple principals and have little trouble 
finding a position. 
In our analysis of teacher placements, we found that early-offer teachers were more likely 
than incumbents to work in the schools in Zone 1, home to the most challenging conditions in the 
district, but so were other new teachers. Early-offer teachers were also more likely than incumbents 
to work in focus and priority schools, and here they did also differ from other new teachers. The 
program had mixed results in high need subject areas. The early offers program was able to secure 
an above average number of math and ESL/bilingual teachers. It was not, however, able to secure 
an above average number of special education teachers. 
In our analysis of teacher outcomes, we saw that among first-year teachers, early-offer 
teachers outperformed those hired on a standard timeline, but this result was only statistically 
significant for student surveys.  The suggestive evidence demands further research. More data is 
necessary to discern whether the differences between early-offer teachers and other new teachers 
are robust. It may be that student surveys are an important indicator if students are able to observe 
learning both within themselves and amongst their peers before that learning can be measured on 
standardized tests or made clear to observers who only see one or two lessons. Given that screening 
interviews were looking for teachers who had a strong growth mentality and who were receptive 
to performance feedback, it could also be that the teachers who were identified for early offers 
have a steeper growth trajectory and in subsequent years they will outperform the teachers hired 
on the standard timeline by wider margins. If this is the case, differences registered after the first 
year or two of teaching would be smaller than differences detectable mid-career. We leave this for 
future research. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
MPS sought to identify and hire outstanding teachers early in the hiring process. To do this, they 
implemented centralized and standardized screening interviews and extended offers in April and 
May to standout candidates. The early-offer teachers fared well in the internal labor market where 
they were more likely to be chosen for interviews (once controlling for default rules advantaging 
the four most senior teachers who apply for a position), more likely to be ranked highly, and more 
likely to be offered positions than incumbent teachers who applied for openings. This was despite 
the fact that early-offer teachers were younger, had less experience, and were less likely to hold 
advanced degrees than incumbent teachers. 
We also found that the district had some success getting these teachers to the classrooms 
where they were needed most. On average, early-offer teachers were more likely to apply to and 
be hired into schools that were less desirable to incumbents. These schools had higher shares of 
non-white students as well as more students below proficiency in math and/or reading. Early-offer 
teachers were more likely to be hired into “focus” or “priority” schools and for ESL/bilingual and 
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math positions. Early-offer teachers, however, were not more likely to be special education 
teachers, another hard to staff area. Though securing staff for difficult positions is notable, it 
remains to be seen whether the early-offer teachers remain in these positions in the long run. 
The program’s promising interview/placement patterns are encouraging and consistent 
with the conclusion that the early offers program changed hiring patterns for this large urban 
district. The best test of the program’s success, however, is to see if these stand out candidates 
turned out to be stand out teachers. Here we have suggestive but not conclusive evidence. The 
cohorts studied had been in the classroom for one or two years. In that short tenure, we found that 
they outperformed other new teachers on most measurable outcomes but that most the differences 
rose to the conventional levels of statistical significance. This leads us to believe that these teachers 
may be above average teachers, but more data is needed before we can make a strong claim. A 
more conservative, and entirely appropriate, conclusion is that early-offer teachers are 
indistinguishable from their peers hired on a more traditional timeline.  Some of these candidates 
may have been hired anyway later in the summer. Even if this is the case, the early placement is 
beneficial if it allows for better onboarding and preparation during the summer months. 
The early offers program is an example of a low-cost intervention to improve the efficiency 
in teacher labor markets. That said, even a low-cost intervention requires investment of time and 
district HR resources. It also required a good amount of political capital in negotiation with the 
teachers’ union. The main cost to the program is thus the opportunity cost of staff time and buy-in 
from senior teachers who now have to compete for positions against early-offer candidates. If the 
early-offer teachers turn out to be no better or only slightly better than other new hires, the benefits 
of the accelerated timeline may not be large enough to justify the opportunity cost.  
Another concern is that the early offer program did not successfully secure more special 
education teachers nor did it produce a more diverse pool of candidates. As the early offer program 
has evolved, the district has placed more emphasis on using it for hard to staff areas and also as a 
tool to secure high performing student teachers. Future research will follow the initial cohort of 
early-offer teachers to assess retention and longer-term effectiveness outcomes as well as newer 
cohorts where the program was more targeted and also more formally defined by the collective 
bargaining contract. 
One final policy implication is important to note. Our examination has allowed us to 
explore the early offer program's operation and consequences within a single urban district. That 
is, this paper is a firm-specific, rather than market-level analysis. State-level policymakers 
interested in reforming teacher hiring standards and practices to address teacher shortages would 
need to pay attention to how one district's reforms may influence a neighboring district's overall 
supply of labor and distribution of teacher talent and future research should address these larger 
equilibrium issues. 
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